

EXHIBIT NO. 1276 Doc. 1632W-105

木 戸 侯 爵 日 記

昭和十九年一月六日（木） 晴

午前十時出勤

十一時松平官長ト獨乙ノ運命ト其ノ後ニ於ル情
勢ニ對スル日本ノ對策ニツキ話ス。尙研究ヲ依
頼ス。

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 1632w

一九・一・六

昭和十九年新春ニ當リ、來ルベキ一年ノ進捗ヲ考フルニ何ト言フモ與國相違ノ運命が最も問題ナリ、更ニ一年獨逸が健固シ、進ンテ攻勢ニ轉ズル丈ノ餘力ヲ有スルニ於テハ事態ハ大ニ緩和セラルルモ、若シ萬一本年内ニ獨逸ノ崩壊ヲ見ルが如キコトアランカ、我國ノ立場ハ眞ニ危殆ニ至リト言ハザルベカラズ。如斯事態ノ發生ヲ希望スルニハアラザレド萬一ノ場合ヲ考慮シ之ガ對策ヲ研究シ置クノ要アリト思フ。

先ヅ第一ニ考ヘザルベカラザルハ獨逸が崩壊即チ無條件降服シタル場合日本モ同時ニ戦争終結ニ導ク手ヲ打ツヤ否ヤナリ。

此點ニツイテハ日本ハ其當時ノ情報ニヨリ獨自ノ判斷ニヨリ行動スベキハ勿論トス。

但シ此場合敵ノ政治謀略ノ大攻勢ヲ受クベキハ當然ニシテ從ツテ國內ニ於テモ所關バドリオノ壁續出スベキヲ以テ此ノ對策が最も決心ヲ要スルトコ

一 太平洋ノ問題ハ太平洋ニ處メル主要國ニ於テ之ヲ處理ス。

一 日蘇交米突ヲ以テ委員會ヲ組織ス。

一 我國ノ占領セル地域及太平洋ニアル諸島ハ非武装地帯トス。

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ロナルベシ。

如新事態ノ發生シタル場合良佳内閣ノ存續ハ相當困難ヲ豫想セラルベキガ注意スルニ至リタル場合從來通り重臣會議ニ諮リテ後繼者ヲ奏請スルノミニテ果シテ充分ナリヤ否ヤハ問題ナリ。

寧ロ此ノ段階ニ達シタル場合ニハ後繼者ヲ推舉スルニ先テ今後日本ノ推行スベキ大体ノ外交方針ヲ重臣會議ニ決定シ、之ガ實施ノ任ニ當ルベキ内閣ヲ奏請スルモ一策ニアラザルカ研究スベキ一問題ナリ。

次ニ如此事態トナリタル場合ニハ相當大膽ニ譲歩シタル案ニアラザレバ之カ成立ノ見込ナシト信ズ而シ大東亞戦争ノ開始ハ所謂 A B C D ノ包圍体勢ノ打破ニアリタルハ宣戰ノ御詔誓ニモ明ナルトコロナレバ之レガ目的ヲ達成ッ得レバ一應ノ結末ニ到達シタルモノト言フコトヲ得ベシ。

即チ此觀點ヨリ大体左ノ如キ案ヲ考慮ッ得ベシ。

一 太平洋ノ問題ハ太平洋ニ臨メル主要國ニ於テ之ヲ處理ス。

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2.

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3.

一 此地域ニ存在スル主要國以外ノ獨立國（滿洲國ヲ除ク）ハ瑞典ノ如キ永世中立國トス、其他ノ占領地ハ右主要國ノ混合委員會ニテ處理スルコトトス。

一 此地域ノ經濟政策ハ原則トシテ自由互惠機會均等トス。

本策ヲ如何ナル時期ニ如何ナル方法ニヨリ採案スルカガ最も慎重ニ研究スベキ問題ナルガ

時期ハ獨逸ノ崩壊ト同時トセズ而カモ米英蘇ガ一致シテ日本ニ當ラザル以前ヲ可トスベシ。

方法ハ蘇ヲシテ仲介セシムルヲ可トスベシ。

以上ノ案ハ一見餘リニ謙遜シ軟弱ナリト思ヘル、ヤモ知レザレド熟ラ今後ノ世界ノ大勢ヲ變觀スルニ支那事變、獨ソ段ノ江廠、航空機ノ發達、米蘇ノ實力等ヨリ見又我國力ノ激増ナル消能ニ値ミ今後一世紀位ハ眞ニ内ニ實力ヲ養フノ時ナリト思考ス。若シ此判斷ニシテ誤リナクンバ此際我國ガ孤立シ有色人種トシテ世界ヨリ總攬セラルルハ最も避ケザルベカラザルトコロニシテ此觀點ヨリスルモアングロサクソントタル米英ニ對スルニ大体東洋的ナル蘇支ト提携シ臨機應變ノ態勢ヲ整ヘヒソカニ内ニ實力ヲ蓄フルヲ最も策ノ得タルモノナリト信ズ。

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Entry for 17 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

17 July (Monday) clear

At 12.20 A.M. Premier TOJO came to my house and explained the Cabinet policy as is given in the separate paper. I acknowledged it.

At 8 Mr. HIROSE called, and I listened to information from all quarters.

Received in audience from 9.40 to 10.20. I reported to the Throne on the policy which Premier TOJO talked about.

At 10.30 Minister of State, KISHI, came to the office. He told me that he had been requested to resign by Premier TOJO, and he asked me for advice as to deciding how he should move. He said that he had come to me for advice after obtaining the Premier's consent. At 11.30, as is Chief of the Imperial Guards, NAKAMURA came to the office. At 2 o'clock, Premier TOJO came to the office after his audience with the Emperor. Talked to me about appointing General UMEZU as Chief of the Army General Staff. There was a talk with him. In the afternoon. Received "SEITAIJITSU" /T.N. Type of physical culture remedy./ from Mr. TAKAHASHI. At 8, WADA came. Had a talk with him. Admiral OKADA came at 9.30. There was a talk with him. In the afternoon. Received "SEITAIJITSU" /T.N. Type of physical culture remedy./ from Mr. TAKAHASHI. At 8, WADA came. Had a talk with him. Admiral OKADA came at 9.30.

At 9.30 P.M. on 17 July, 1944, Admiral Keisuke OKADA called and talked to me as follows:

1. A Senior Statesmen's council was held at Baron HIRANUMA's house today.

1. Those who attended were Messrs. WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIRANUMA, HIROTA, ABE, KONOYE and YONAI.

1. Mr. WAKATSUKI is made chairman, and he begins to talk first. This Cabinet has completely lost the sympathy of the public; and he thinks that the present situation is really serious. He asks for opinions.

1. YONAI: The matter /T.N. portion illegible/ has been under discussion since the 13th, and after careful

consideration, I have written declining the offer. As OKA, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau came and talked to me about the general opinion of the Navy and all, I replied that it would be reasonable for me to be returned to active service again and serve as Supreme War Councillor or in any other capacity; but that even if I entered the Cabinet as Minister of State I could be of little service, and that it would not be the thing to do. I have no intention of joining the Cabinet.

ABE: Although the people are completely out of sympathy with this Cabinet, the situation would become more difficult if it were replaced by a still weaker Cabinet. We must think about such points. As President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, I must decide my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

HIRANUMA: Whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next Cabinet will be a weak one or not is not the point. The point is that we are really concerned about our country, and we must make up our minds to do something.

HIROTA: I also was asked to help by KARASAWA who talked about diplomatic policy vis a vis the Soviet Union, but no one has talked to me since then. Even if I were asked to, I should not join the Cabinet.

Questions and answers were exchanged between OKADA and ABE over the question of the Navy. Finally the following decision was made and the meeting adjourned.

Accordingly, I asked him /T.N. OKADA/ if I might understand by the above talk that I have been given information concerning the gathering of the senior statesmen, that is, if I might take it that he had come with the intention of keeping contact, and as he replied in the affirmative, I acknowledged that such was the case. I asked him because I thought that I should have to give careful consideration, if he intended to ask me to report it to the Emperor.

"In order to find our way through the current difficult situation, it is necessary to renew the popular mind. All people must rally and cooperate to build a powerful national Cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly. A partial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."

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At 12.20 on 17 July, 1944, Premier TOJO called and explained the Cabinet policy which may be summed up as follows:

"As we are told of the Emperor's intention regarding the three points to which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal called attention some time ago, we have decided to carry out the consolidation of the Supreme Command as well as a change of Navy Ministers. I had a talk with the candidate for Navy Minister, Admiral Naokuni NOMURA, tonight, and we agreed."

"When we decided our policy at first, we were not thinking of the question of the Supreme Command. But things have reached a point where this has had to be taken into consideration because of the general situation, since it was feared that a state might arise in which there would be insufficient unity between Army and Navy. From this point of view, we have changed our policy on reorganization of Cabinet and other problems to minimum."

"Reinforcement of Headquarters. The Liaison Conference which has been inclined to be businesslike and has not been made use of to the fullest extent, shall be renovated and strengthened. It shall consist of two ministers of state of the Premier class (ABE and YONAI considered) besides both Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of War and Navy, Munitions, Finance and the Foreign Minister."

Cabinet reorganization.

"In order to strengthen the air force, FUJIWARA shall serve full time as Minister of Munitions, and, therefore, we request retirement of Mr. KISFI as Minister of State. MAEDA or SHIMADA shall be appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in the Cabinet. General ABE and Admiral YONAI will be asked to join the Cabinet as Ministers of State in order to reinforce the Imperial Headquarters."

In connection with the Senior Statesmen:

"We are prepared to consider the revival of the Cabinet Advisory system, if it is desired by the Senior Statesmen. Hereafter, the Cabinet members shall always keep close contact with the Senior Statesmen and fully reflect their intentions."

In connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance
Political Society:

"The advisory set-up shall be divided into two
departments, technical and political, and five advisors
shall be appointed from among the members of the House
of Peers and the House of Representatives."

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本戸侯日記ヨリ、按年(昭和九年七月十七日命)

七月十七日(日)晴

午前零時二十分東條首相來卸内閣、方針ニツキ別紙通り説明アリ
一應諒承ス

八時廣瀨氏來訪各方面情報ヲ聽ク

九時二十分ヨリ十時二十分迄拜謁東條首相ヨリ話々タルヲ針言ス

十時半岸團相來室ヨリ辭職ヲ要求アリシニ進退ニツキ相談アリ
多シ余ハ相談ハ首相ニ諒解ヲ得タトノコトナリ 十一時半中村警衛

局長來室二時東條首相拜謁後來室總長ニ梅澤大將云々ト、話アリ
二時四十分ヨリ同五十分迄拜謁 三時官舎ニ至リ廣瀨氏同時止五公
ト面談多ク方帰宅

高橋氏正体術ヲナス

八時和田來訪面談九時半岡田大將來卸別紙如キ話アリヨリ

昭和十九年六月十六日午後九時半岡田大將來訪左、要
旨、話アリタリ

一本日平沼男郎ニ於テ重臣、會合ヲ開催シタリ

一參集者若槻、岡田、平沼、三田、阿部、中衛、米内、各氏

一若槻氏座長トナリ、先ツ發言ス、此、内閣ニ、人心ハ全ク離反セリ、

而シテ時局ハ真ニ重大ナリト考ス、御意見ヲ承リタリ

一米内十三日以來(以下數字不明)

交渉アリシヲ以テ熟慮、上御断リスト書キテ渡シタリ、岡軍務

局長來リ海軍、御音信云々ト云ル故自分カ海軍ニ盡スト云フナ

ハ現役復歸ニテ軍事參議官ナリ何ナリニテハ働クナリハ判ルカ

國務大臣トシテ入閣スルトモ何、カニモナラズ、ハハ筋カ違フニアラズヤ

Ex-1277

No. 1

Doc/632W(106)

ト答(雲キタリ)自今、入閣ノ意思ナシ

阿部 此内閣が人心ヲ失ヒ居ルトスルモ之ニ代ルニ更ニ弱体ナルモ、カキ
来テ、益々時局ハ困難トナルベシ、ソレ等ノ点モ考慮セザルベカラズ自
今ハ異政會總裁ナレバ異政會ノ態度ニヨリ去就ヲ決セザルベカラズ
平沼 内閣 倒ストカ倒サストカ式ハ決、内閣が弱体トハ何トカ云
ルトハ問題ニアラズ真ニ國ヲ憂フルカ故ニ何等カノ決意ヲナサ
ルベカラズト思フナリ

広田 自今モ唐澤ヨリ援助ヲ求メ来リ対シ外交云々等、
話モアリシが其後何ノ交渉モナシ自今ハ交渉アルモ入閣セザルベシ
岡田ト阿部ト、同ニ海軍問題ヲメグリ、應酬アリシが最後ニ決
、如キ決定ヲナシ散會ス

依ッテ余ノ右、御話ハ重臣、御集リニ關スル情報ヲ承リタリ、意ニ
解ス 即チ連絡、意味ニテ御出ニナリタリト解シ可然ヤト固ニ然
リト、答ナリシ故諒承セリ 余ニテ實ニタリ所以ニ上奏ノ依頼ノ意
思ナリトスルハ慎重ニ考慮ヲ要スト考ヘタリヲ以テナリ

此、難局ヲ切抜ケルニハ人心ヲ新ニスルコトが必要デゴサイマス國
民全部が相知シ相協カシ一路邁進スル強カナル舉國一致内
閣ヲ作ルコトが必要ト考ヘマス内閣、一部改造、如キハ何ノ役モ
立タナイト思ヒマス

※別紙

昭和十九年七月十七日零時ニ於テ東條首相末郎大等左如ク

内閣方針ニツキ説明アリタリ

No. 2/☆

過般内大臣ヨリ、注意アリタル三英ニツキ御ニ、御意向モ承リタリ
以テ統帥、確立海相ノ交渉ハ之ヲ斷行スルニ決シ今夜海相候補
野村直邦大將ニ面談意見、一致ヲ見ルニ至リ

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當初、方針決定、際ニハ統帥問題(考へ居らざりしが大勢上ニテ
考慮セザルベカラザルニ至ル結果免モスバ陸海軍、統一ニ充
分ナル事態ヲ惹起スル慮アリ、此兵ヨリ見テ内閣、改造其、他、内
閣、最小限度ニ止ムルノ方針ニ変更セリ

大本營、強化

從來兎角事務的トナリ活用不充分ナル連絡會議ヲ刷新強
化シ總理級、國務大臣三名(阿部米内ヲ考エラ加ヘ)兩總長、兩大臣
軍需、外務、大藏等ヲ加ヘ構成ス

内閣、改造

航空增強、為メ軍需大臣ヲ亭任トシ藤原國務大臣ヲ充ッ
從テ國務大臣トシテ、岸全、退任ヲ求メ翼政會ヨリ、入閣セ
シル為メ厚生大臣ニ前田又ハ嶋田ヲ起用ス、大本營會議強化、意
味ニテ阿部米内兩大將ニ國務大臣トシテ入閣ヲ交渉ス

皇臣關係

皇臣側ニ於テ希望アリバ參議制、^意複選ヲ考慮スル用意アリ
今後閣僚ヲシテ皇臣ト常ニ連絡セシメ充分、皇臣、意向ヲ
反映セシム

翼政會關係

顧問制ヲ技術、政治、兩部門ニ分テ政治顧問五人ヲ置キ之ニ貴
族兩院議員ヲ配ス

1632 女

以上

1278 11377
Entry for 18 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

18 July 1944. (Clear).

Hottest weather of the year. Today's entry is on separate sheets.

At 8 A.M. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me. Received report on the circumstances of the Senior Statesmen's Conference at HIRANUMA's house.

Mr. Hisatada HIROSE came and talked to me about the pressing situation.

Went to the office at 9 A.M.

Was received in audience from 9:15 to 9:30. Reported to the Throne concerning the trend of the Senior Statesmen, principally about their meeting at HIRANUMA's residence. At 9:30 Premier TOJO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to be received in audience. Saw him and talked with him in the First Anteroom. The Premier revealed to me that he had decided on a resignation en bloc. Accordingly, I said that in order to carry out the political change smoothly, in view of the importance of the Army's position in the domestic picture, I should like to be informed, for my own information, of the succeeding Prime Minister, if he had one in mind. The Premier answered that the Senior Statesmen have a heavy responsibility for the present political change; therefore, he supposed that they must have a plan in mind and he would not venture to give his opinions. However, in case a cabinet headed by an Imperial prince were considered, he hoped that none of the Army royalty would be taken into consideration.

Received in audience from 10:05 A.M. to 10:25. Reported among other things to the Emperor about the Senior Statesmen's Conference, to be held following the resignation en bloc of the cabinet.

Was received in audience from 11:25 to 11:40, and was shown the written resignation of TOJO and the other cabinet members.

TSURUKO was preparing lunch at the official residence so I went there at noon with Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA. Mrs. Keiko SOMA came with her daughter Hisako and they had lunch with us.

Went to work at 1:30. In response to a summons from His Majesty, had an audience from 4 to 4:02. His Majesty asked me

if HIRANUMA intended to form a cabinet. I replied that he probably did not.

Then I went at once to the Senior Statesmen's Conference.

The Details of the Senior Statesmen's Conference

Having been summoned by the Emperor former Prime Minister: WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, KONOYE, HIRANUMA, ABE and YONAI, President of the Privy Council HARA and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO met in conference, at 4 P.M. on 18 July Showa /1944/. Discussion was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne as premier of the succeeding cabinet, Premier TOJO having tendered his resignation. The conference was closed at 8:45 P.

Grand Chamberlain HYAKUTAKE, who attended the meeting in accordance with the Emperor's wish, notified those present of the import of the Imperial summons. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances which had led to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet.

The members then went into a discussion. First of all, Mr. YONAI reported on how he had been asked by the cabinet to join it. His report was as follows:

(1) At about 5:30 A.M. of the 13th Secretary AKAMATSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit me. He, however, did not come, tho I do not know the reason.

(2) On the 17th Finance Minister ISHIWATA called and urged me to join the Cabinet. Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged me to join the Cabinet, for the sake of the Navy. But I replied that it was unreasonable, that it might be a different matter if, for the sake of the Navy I returned to active service in the Navy and became a member of the Supreme War Council but I could be of no use by becoming a State Minister. I wrote a note to Mr. OKA saying, "After deep consideration I have decided to reject the proposal," and thus indicated my decision.

(3) A little past 9 P.M. on the 17th, SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau called on me. Navy Minister NOMURA was here also. They urged me by turns to join the Cabinet but in the end failed to make me change my mind.

Then the discussion began, the important questions and answers being as follows:

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion, Mr. KIDO?

KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yet, but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it a good idea to consider the matter along lines of the agreement made at the meeting at BARON HIRANUMA's residence?

HAPA: What meeting was that?

WAKATSUKI: The Senior Statesmen met at Baron HIRANUMA's home, out of anxiety over the national situation. No special discussion occurred at the time concerning a new Cabinet.

ABE: Let me express my views to expedite the discussion. As a split between the state affairs and the Supreme Command will be dangerous, it is necessary that they keep in close contact. In short, I think a military man on the active list will be suitable at this time. And as the Navy plays the most important role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man should take up the premiership? For this reason, what do you say to asking Admiral YONAI to assume the duty?

YONAI: In my opinion, the military man's original duty is to devote himself to the particular field of strategy and command, and it is most proper that the civil officials handle political affairs. It is unwise to appoint now from the Army and now from the Navy, like GENJI and HEIKE.

ABE: That's not my idea.

YONAI: If there is no suitable man among the civil officials, it will be better that an Army man assume the post. I would not be able to hold the position for a month, and judging from my past experience, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

WAKATSUKI: For the purpose of discussion I suggest this as a tentative plan. I think a military man is preferable during war-time. At present we must rely upon the Navy as our first line of national defense. Hence, if any Navy man were to be suggested for the premiership I wonder if he wouldn't feel scruples about taking it. Therefore, I think it is better that some one from the Army take the post. A Premier should have political ability. In this sense, I think General UGAKI would be most competent though I do not know the latest conditions. General ABE seemed to have an objection to the idea previously, but--.

ABE: I do not know how General UGAKI is getting along.

YONAI: I understand the fact that the Navy stands at the forefront. After all, the Military should concentrate on warfare. The Military men have naturally received a one-sided education, and I believe that it is for this very reason that they are

strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitable for politics.

WAKATSUKI: Mr. YONAI's view is not without reason, but our country's practice is quite different from that of England and America. Also, our nation is not educated according to the same custom as that of America and Britain. It would be difficult for Japan to reach that point in one jump.

YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country will be done for.

KONOYE: If the military authorities themselves do not correct this point, the civilian officials certainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taking the matter practically ---- /original illegible/ a military person would be better. A military man with such ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or Navy shall be decided by narrowing down the discussion.

KIDO: In short, it is a practical problem. Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried to reform the political system simultaneously it would be impossible to do. To think on two planes at this time will obscure our objective.

HIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE. We are now at the stage where we must think of how to protect our national structure and the security of the Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions production alone could not be handled by anybody but a military man.

WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our process of selection.

YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging from my past experience as a premier.

WAKATSUKI: That was peacetime.

HARA: To be sure, my official position is such that I do not know how the political situation stands. The present situation is so grave that the next Cabinet will decide the fate of our country. It would be too much to place the full responsibility on a single military man alone. It should be a national cabinet of influential and popular people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let about five men cooperate and accept the responsibility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right. The Imperial command will fall upon the five men here and they, choosing the premier from among themselves, will cooperate in administering state

affairs. The situation is such that no one can undertake it.

KIDO: I can well understand what Mr. HARA means. I don't suppose that any one objects so far, but I believe that the practical application would be very difficult.

WAKATSUKI: Just as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal says, we should indicate one individual in replying, or His Majesty may have trouble.

HIROTA: The situation may become such that a desperate act will become necessary. We must also think of the security of the Imperial Family. The new Cabinet must be the highest and most powerful organization. At this time, should we not have a Prince of the blood at the head of the new Cabinet? I feel that a good number of Army and Navy General Officers should closely assist the Emperor.

Prince KONOYE: A Cabinet of the Imperial Family is not proper at the present stage.

HIRANUMA: I, too, think it is not good, though the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

WAKATSUKI: An Imperial Family cabinet is not good.

OKADA: The next Cabinet should be a strong national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from home. It must fight out the war, and it must wage an impossible war. The question is how to make a real national Cabinet.

HARA: I think so too. One man cannot do it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall keep silence.

OKADA: The next Cabinet ought not be a cabinet of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

KIDO: I can well understand what you mean, but practically speaking what do you want to do?

HARA: The Cabinet should not belong to this man or that.

HIRANUMA: That is the very way I feel, but at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place. At the present stage, it must be some one from the military. It goes without saying that the Cabinet is under direct Imperial rule.

WAKATSUKI: That is right.

OKADA: As far as this point is concerned, I am of the same opinion as YONAI. It might be best if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who has a clear idea of the Emperor's wishes and of the home situation were to do it.

HARA: That will do because the Ministers of War and Navy will select both Chiefs of General Staff in the field of military command.

KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign situations, and especially the strengthening of home defense, I believe that the next premier should be an army man.

WAKATSUKI: Our answer to the Throne should not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will need further discussion.

ABE: In plain words then, it has been generally agreed that a military man is preferable. However, a man who is a military man alone is not enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out warfare, civil officials and retired military men cannot keep satisfactory contact with military operations. Navy men would be suitable for brightening up our nation.

HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this time to form a real national Cabinet, with a member of the Imperial Family in the central post.

WAKATSUKI: It is not good to impose political responsibility upon the Imperial Family.

KIDO: That is right.

HIRANUMA: At this stage it's still not right.

Renew the same

KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police require that we choose some one from the Army.

ABE: That will not renew the people's morale.

WAKATSUKI: An army man seems better.

YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at first, I think that an Army man is best after all, having heard the explanation of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion on this point.

ABE: The Army is unpopular. The nation's trust in the Navy is apparent.

HIRANUMA: At present there are two viewpoints prevalent among the people, and the Army is on the unpopular side.

HIROTA: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal mean martial law by his previous explanation?

KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the stationing of army forces all over the country.

YONAI: How about Marshal TERAUCHI?

ABE: There is reason to think it would be difficult in practice.

HIRANUMA: It is not good, to delay the formation of the Cabinet at this time.

KONOYE: Why did the TOJO Cabinet fall? -- Because it had declined in public favor. Therefore, the Army must change its attitude in order to renew popular confidence.

HIRANUMA: The desire in all quarters is that the Army stop interfering with them.

KONOYE: There have been leftist thoughts among some men in the army for more than ten years. Today there is an attempt to carry out a left-wing revolution through the cooperation of the Military, the officials, and the people. This is more dangerous than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution more than defeat, for even if defeated, we can maintain the Imperial Family and the national structure, but in case of a leftist revolution we cannot do so. From this viewpoint the selection of the War Minister is most important.

YONAI: Judging from that point, an army man is better.

WAKATSUKI: I've entertained doubts on that point for some time.

HIRANUMA: So have I.

KONOYE: Can TERAUCHI control that?

ABE: He is a straightforward man, but in the first place to call him back from the front would be difficult.

ABE: The next premier must be some one popular among the Army.

WAKATSUKI: Isn't UGAKI popular among the Army?

ABE: I do not know how popular he has been recently.

YONAI: Mr. ABE, isn't there anyone who is popular?

ABE: UMEZU is a man of character. There are a few others but they are all at the front and it will be difficult to call them back.

HIRANUMA: UMEZU is out of the question. Isn't there any other Navy man?

YONAI: In view of what the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal has said, it might be better to choose someone from the Army.

HIRANUMA: Considerable experience would be needed to suppress the leftism referred to by Prince KONOYE.

KONOYE: There are some people who recommend Mr. Kentaro SUZUKI.

YONAI: We had better not recommend him.

HIRANUMA: Putting aside individual reasons, I think it proper that he take the post for the sake of the state. I know him very well and think he is an honorable man.

YONAI: I said that from the standpoint of the nation's interest.

HIROTA: He seems to be a moderate person.

HIRANUMA: Tho he is strong he is a man who can accept other people's opinions.

HARA: I know him very well, too, after working together with him in the Privy Council. Mr. SUZUKI has always said he will never take a political seat as he is a soldier. He has even said that even if commanded by His Majesty /T.N. to form a cabinet/ he would never accept it. I'm telling you this for reference.

OKADA: As a man he is a fine person, but when I think of the soldiers at the front, I think an Army man is better.

HIROTA: I feel that we are in an important stage where we must reform the basis of the Japanese system. Everybody should be present at Imperial Headquarters.

HIRANUMA: In practice, this is impossible.

HIROTA: As the prosecution of the war is first and foremost, as long as the four pillars of the Army and the Navy are firm, that is enough.

KIDO: A man like Marshal TERAUCHI is one of them too.

WAKATSUKI: Now that we are conferring, the people may feel uneasy unless the Imperial Command to form a cabinet is issued in a day or two. Therefore I think we had better choose either UGAKI or General UMEZU.

KIDO: How about Marshal HATA?

KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an army man is to be recommended, it is a necessary condition that he make a change in the Army so as to renew the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist element. If UMEZU can do this, he may be all right.

HIRANUMA: Political experience is necessary.

KIDO: What is the comment at the front about Mr. UGAKI? As there is the enemy's propaganda offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's appointment causes discontent and unrest among the soldiers at the front.

ABE: Is the idea of a Navy man in the minority?

ABE: If an army man is preferred, the next question is who?

KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about TERAUCHI or HATA?

ABE: The order may be (1) TERAUCHI, (2) UMEZU, and (3) HATA.

KIDO: As to UMEZU, the fact that he has only recently been appointed Chief of the Army General Staff and that he has had no ministerial career should be considered.

HIRANUMA: The next is YONAI, a Navy man.

KONOYE: There is also Mr. Kantaro SUZUKI.

KONOYE: And what about the question of Mr. UGAKI?

HIRANUMA: I don't know about him lately.

KIDO: What other army generals are there besides these?

ABE: Well, there are HONJO, ARAKI, KOISO, and then there's TOJO.

KIDO: How about KOISO?

YONAI: KOISO is a good man, capable and courageous.

KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGAKI's type but of smaller calibre?

ABE: Absolutely different.

KIDO: How does he get along with Army men of the active list?

ABE: Not so badly, I believe. He is a different sort of man from TOJO.

HIRANUMA: He is a high calibre man and a pious one.

KIDO: What are his ideas?

WAKATSUKI: I have no objection, although I don't know him.

OKADA: KONOYE: We don't know him too well. What are the opinions of Mr. YONAI and Mr. HIRANUMA? He was a member of each of your cabinets.

FIROTA: No objection.

ABE: No objection.

OKADA: Now we must reexamine the question of whether KOISO can organize a truly national Cabinet. This is an extremely important time and, as we need not come to a final decision in one or two hours, I want to study the matter fully.

KIDO: I have in mind a plan to request the Emperor to call a conference of Senior Statesmen and Ministers in the Imperial Palace like the conferences of Elder Statesmen and Ministers of past years. I am now studying that matter.

OKADA: The formation of a cabinet requires careful thought.

FIROTA: How about a cabinet by direct Imperial order /OFORUMEI NAIKAKU/ or a coalition cabinet of Army and Navy?

WAKATSUKI: Actually there is a vice-premier in every cabinet.

KIDO: I must submit to the Throne Mr. FARA's opinion in detail.

KIDO: What is the order of the candidates?

WAKATSUKI: TERAUCHI, FATA, KOISO, and a naval man.

HIRANUMA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATA, and a naval man.

YONAI: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATA. By the way when I recommended KOISO as a cabinet member before, the Emperor asked for the reason.

HIRANUMA: Speaking of KOISO I was asked by the Emperor about his connection with the UGAKI affair.

KONOYE: I don't know any of the three.

HIROTA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATA.

ABE: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATA.

OKADA: I don't know any of the three.

KIDO: I would like to have a meeting of the Senior Statesmen and the Imperial nominee in order that the former may support the latter.

WAKATSUKI: If they were to hamper the nominee, of course it would be very bad, but if the nominee himself wishes it, we will meet with pleasure.

KIDO: Thank you for taking part in this long discussion. I will submit your opinions in detail to the Throne.

- - -

The meeting being closed, I was immediately received in audience by the Emperor in his study from 8:50 to 9:15. I reported the results of the conference in detail. I asked the Emperor to inquire of the Army High Command whether the appointment of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI, the first candidate, would affect the military operations as he is the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army. The Emperor replied that he would have the Chief Aide-de-Camp ask the Chief of the General Staff TOJO (who happened to be at the palace for the installation ceremony for new Chief of the General Staff UMEZU). At 9:50 p.m., I was received in audience again. His Majesty told me as follows:

Upon the Emperor's asking Chief of the General Staff TOJO as to the effect upon the military operations of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI's appointment, the latter opposed the idea for the following two reasons. The Emperor thought them reasonable and has decided to appoint General KOISO.

1) When the enemy's counter-offensive is at its height, it is impossible to leave the post of front line Supreme Commander vacant even for a single day.

2) To allow the domestic political situation to affect the front lines is bad for morale, and is certain to cause serious repercussions in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,

as well as among neutral powers. Therefore, such a step must be avoided by all means.

After asking the Emperor to summon the Grand Chamberlain and to order him to make arrangements for summoning General KOISO, I withdrew.

I was summoned and was received in audience from 10:10 to 10:25 p.m. The Emperor revealed to me his impression that judging from the line-up at the installation ceremony, TOJO might resume the post of War Minister after all and asked me if I didn't think so. I replied that I feared that it would have an unfavorable effect on the political situation.

It was past eleven when I returned home and at last had dinner.

* * *

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木戸俊日記ヨリノ抜萃

昭和十九年七月十八日(晴)

暑氣本年よりナリ長日ノ記事ハ別紙ニテリ

別紙

昭和十九年七月十八日

午前八時松平秘書官長来邸平沼邸ニ於ケル重臣ノ會同ノ
情況等ニ報告ヲ受ク

廣瀬久忠氏来邸緊迫セル情況ニツキ話アリタリ

午前十時出仕

九時十五分ヨリ同三十分迄拝謁平沼邸ニ於ケル重臣會同ヲ
中心ニ重臣ノ動向ニツキ言上ス

九時半東條首相拝謁為メ参内第一休所ニ於テ面談ス
首相ハ總辭職ヲ決意セル旨内意ヲ漏サル依ツテ余ハ陸軍ノ
國內体勢ニ有ル重要性ニ鑑ミ内滿ニ改変ヲ推移セル為メ
自分ノ含ミ迄ニ後継首相ニツキ考へアレバ承リ置キ度レト
尋ネタルニ首相ハ今回ノ改変ニハ重臣ノ責任カ重ト考フ
從ツテ重臣ニハ既ニ腹案ガアリコトノ思フ故敢テ自今意
見ハ述べズ只皇族内閣等ヲ考慮セラル場合ニハ陸軍ノ皇族
ヲ考ヘテ様願度レ云々ト答ヘテタリ

午前十時五分ヨリ同十五分迄拝謁内閣總辭職ニ伴フ重臣
會議開催其他ニツキ言上ス

十一時十五分ヨリ同四十分迄拝謁東條首相以下ノ辭表ヲ
拝見ス

乙午、鷗子官舎ニテ晝食、仁友ヲナシ居ルヲ以テ松平官長ヲ
伴ヒ赴テ相馬慶子サシム子令嬢ヲ伴ヒ晝食ヲ共ニス
一時半出仕

四時ヨリ四時ニ分迄即召ニヨリ拝謁、平沼ニ於テ組閣意ヲ
アルニアラスヤト仰寄ネアリ恐ラク其意ハナルベキ旨奏答ス
直ニ重臣會議ノ席ニ赴テ

重臣會議顛末

昭和十九年七月十八日午後四時ヨリ即召ニヨリ召集セル若槻
岡田、廣田、近衛、平沼、阿部、米内、前首相、系、樞相
五木、内大臣會合、島條内閣總理大臣辭表捧呈セシメテ
後継内閣首班奏請ニテ協議シ午後八時四十分散會ス
百武侍從長旨ヲ奉シテ出席即召ノ趣旨ヲ一同ニ傳フ
木戸内大臣ヨリ島條内閣ノ總辭職ヲ下スニ至リタル事情ヲ詳
細説明ス

次イテ各員ノ協議ニ入りタルガ先ヅ最初ニ米内氏ヨリ内閣ヨリ
入閣ノ交渉ヲ受ケタル経緯ニツイテ報告アリタリ即ケ

一十七日午の五時半頃赤松秘書官ヨリ首相訪問ニ連
絡アリクルモ遂ニ如何ナル事情ナリシカ未訪ハナカリキ

一十七日石渡藏相未訪入閣ヲ勸メラル岡軍務局長未訪
海軍ノ為メ是非入閣ヲト極力勸メラレシカ在ハハ筋違ニテ海
軍ノ為メナレバ現役ニ復帰軍事參議官等ニ就任スルニハ
不サ知ラズ國務大臣トナリテモ何ノ役ニモ立タズト答ヘ「熟慮
ノ結果辭退スルトニ決意ス」書レテ與ヘ自己ノ決意ヲ明ニセリ
一十七日午後九時過佐藤軍務局長未訪野村海軍大臣ニ赴ヒ

ニ来ラレタス勸メタルが遂ニ余ノ決意ヲ繼スニ至リヤ

一次イテ協議スル主ナル回答左ノ如シ

一若槻内府ノ意向ハ如何

一不戸未ダ確定的ナル意見ヲ有セス、先ツ即意向ヲ承リ度シ
平沼男郎ニ於ケル即會合ノ際、申合セノ趣旨ニテ考慮スルハ
可イラサルカ

一原其ノ會合トハ何カ

一若槻ノ態ヲ考慮ノ餘リ重臣ヲ平沼男郎ニ集メリシニテ
後継内閣等ニツイテ別段ノ話ハナカリキ

一阿部ノ問題ノ進行上末席ヨリ意見ヲ述ブ、國務ト統帥

ノ間ニ間隙が生ジテハ大要故是非密接ニ持ツテ行クコトカ必要ナ
端的ニ云ハル此際ハ軍人一ニテ現役ノ者カヨシト思フ、而シテ現下最
モ大事ナ所ハ海軍ナレバ此際海軍ヨリ出ラレテハ如何

就テハ此際米内閣下ニ申願ヒレテハ如何

一米内自今ハ軍人ト云フモノハ作戰統帥ノカラニテ専念スニ
從フヲ希望トスト考ヘ居リ政治ハ文官ガ當ルカ至當ナリ

今度ハ陸軍次ハ海軍ヲ源平ノ如クナルハ宜シカラス

一阿部ノシテ考ヘニハアラス

一米内文官ニ通過仕者ガナレバ陸軍カラ出ラレバ宜シカラン自
分デハ一月持テスト思フ、要テ、自今、經驗カラ見テ却ソテ中
迷惑ヲカケルコト、思フ

一若槻問題ヲ出ス意味ニテ試、案トシテ云フ、戦中ハ矢張り軍人
ガ宜シト思フ、此際國防ノ一線ハ海軍ニ賴ム外ナレズ、海軍
カラ首相カ出ラレト却ソテ中氣兼中、遠慮ガアリハレテ、カト思フ

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從テ部ヲ陸軍ヲ出ラレハ宜シカラト思フ。首相タル以上、政治的
手腕ヲ有セサルベカラズ。此、意味ニテ最近ノ事情ハ自今ハ親子ノ
宇垣大將ヲ適任スラント思フ。先回ハ内閣閣下ニ御呈論下シ
様ニ思フ。

一 所部 宇垣大將、近情ヲ知ス

一 米内 海軍ガ才一課ニ立ツト云フコトハ判ル。軍ハ要スルニ作戰ニ專
念スベキモノナリ。元來軍人ハ凡輪ノ故者ナラザルヲ居ルヲシタ
カラコソ又強ク信じて居ル。從ツテ政治ニハ不向ナリト思フ。

一 若槻 米内閣下、申説ハ一應申カタルガ英米、如キ習慣アルヨ
トハ遠ク國民モ其矣ヲ養成セラント。日本テ一躍シテ行クハ
困難ト思フ。

一 米内 今直サレバ國ハ滅ビル

一 近衛軍自ラ此矣ヲ直スニテラサレバ文官ガヤルコトハ無理ナリ
ソハ理想論ナリ、現實問題(以下不明)

軍人が宜シカラズ。ソラフ考ヘテ持ツタ軍人が宜シ。陸海軍何カ、
強クト狭クテ行ツタヲ決メコトナリ。

一 本戸 要スル現實問題ナリ。戦争完遂ガ才目的ナリ

同時ニ政治ノ建直シテヤラントシテモ実行ハ不可能ナルベシ
此際二面的ニ考フレハ目的ヲ晦迷ナラシムル虞ナリ

一 平沼 近衛公ト全ク同意見ナリ。國體ノ擁護、皇室ノ安泰
迄考ザルベカラズ。段階ナリ。軍需増産ノ点、又見テ元軍人
ニテモ切リサキカシカスト思フ

一 若槻 現役ニ限ラズ軍人ト云フコトニシテハ如何

一 近衛 段々選衛方針ヲ狭クテ行ク者ガ宜シカラ

No. 4

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一 米内 自分ハ首相トシテノ経験ヲ以テ自信ナシ

一 若槻 シンハ平時ナリ

一 原 實ハ自分ハ位置異、政治情勢ガ判ラズ所ナリ、政局ハ極
重大ニシテ此、内閣ニヨリ國ノ運命ガ定ムルト云フ時ナリ、軍人ハ
ニ全責任ヲ負フト云フハ無理ナリ、直ニ威嚇シテ人衆國一致
内閣タルヲ要ス、就テハ五人位協同シテ即引受ケルニトニテ、
如何、卿等協力シテ内閣ヲ組織セヨト仰セズ可ナリ
此處ニ居ルハ、五人ニ對シテ命令ナリ、祖皇ニ首相ヲ選ビ協同致
シテモ國難ニ當ル此、能ク教(以下不明)

ニテ引受ケラル、時勢ニアラスト思フ

一 不戸 原サレハ中氣持ハ良ク判ル、此、其、恐ラク誰レモ中氣持
ハナト思フガ、實行方法ハ頗ル難シイト思フ

一 若槻 内大臣、云ハル、通りテ、大張リ奉答トシテハ誰タト云フ
個人ニセザレバ、困リニナルデハナイヤ

一 廣田 捨身、策ラナス事能クガ、宜ズルヤモハカラズ、皇室、御安
泰ヲモ考ヘサル、カラス、最高、最大ノ組織ナラザルヘカラズ、此、際、皇
族ヲ中心ニ載ッコト、必要ハナキカ、陛下、左右ハ、陸海軍將
官ガ、近山附隨セルコトガ、必要ナリト思フ

一 近衛公 現段階ニテハ皇族内閣ハ不可ナリ

一 平沼 自分モ現段階ニテハ不可ナリト思フ、ソウ云フコトヲ考ヘネバナ
ラヌ時ガ来ルカモ知シナイヤ

一 若槻 皇族内閣ハイヤナ

一 岡田 今、内閣ハ外國ヨリ見テモ、又、國內ヨリ見テモ、強力、舉國一
致、内閣ナラザルヘカラズ、戦、後、カ、ネ、バ、ナ、ラ、ヌ、寧、ろ、戦、争、ヲ、モ、シ、ナ
ケ、レ、バ、ナ、ラ、ヌ、如何ニスレバ、眞、舉國一致内閣ハ、出来得ルヤ

No. 5

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一、原自金元之考名全書無遺

岡田 今度来る内閣は、内閣デ、イナサハ陛下、内閣
ナラザルベカラズ

一 本戸、氣時、ヨク判ルガ實際ドウニヨウト云ハレ、ナカ

一 原 謹々、内閣ト云フコトハ、イケナイ

一 平沼、氣持ハ、通りナルガ何ニモテモ首班ニ立ツ人ヲ決メザルベカラズ

若^ニ令^ル觀^ス ^{此^ハ皆^ニ通^ル} ^{軍^ノ部^ニ} 出身ナラザルカラス 中^ニ親^ク政^ヲ行^フルコトハ勿^ク論ナリ

一 岡田 其矣ニナルト米内ト同様ニ思フ陛下、聖慮モ判ラレ、国内、情勢モ充分判リ居ル内大臣ガヤルガ一番宜シカラシ

一 原 筑帥ハ陸海軍大臣ガ總長ヲ選ク哉ソレニテモヨシ

一 本邦内外、情勢殊ニ今後國內、防衛能力ヲ強化スル上莫リ見テ
陸軍万人ナラザルヘキヲ云フ

一若親 餘^リバト^リ多^ク奉^ル答^ヲ云^ハナ^リ原^ノス^ニ衆^ノテ^ハ又^モ協^ニ議^スル^{コト}
トナル

一 阿部ハツクバラニエニ云フガ軍令ヨカラントハ大体決マシリ而シテ軍人ガ軍人
人夫デハイケンオ 總力戰ノ実情ヨリ見テ文官ヤ豫備軍人デハ作
戰トシテ連絡ハ不充ナリト思フ 國民ヲ明朗ナラシムル爲メ海軍ガ宜シ
カラシ

一廣田此際中心は皇族ヲ戴キ眞ニ舉國一致、内閣ヲ作ル、要アリ
ト思考ス

No. 6

一 若親、皇族ニ政治上ノ責任ヲ帰スルコトナルハ不可ナリ

一本一册

一、平語：現校階_五八未不可十日

一、迎衛

一、本國國防衛體勢，強化陸軍，內地^三於^ル配備增強，憲

No. 7

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兵ノ強化等ヨリ見テ此際陸軍ヨリ出スヨリ外ナシト考フ
阿部ソレデハ人氣一新ニテ又
若槻陸軍ガ宜シカラシ
米内今迄内大臣ノ説明ヲ聽イテ一應ハ文官ト云フ説ヲ
出シガ天張リ陸軍カラ出ラシガ宜シト考フ此点前説ヲ
取消ス
阿部陸軍ハ人氣ナリ海軍ヘノ國民ノ輿望ハ現ハテ居ル
平沼現在國民ノ見方ニツキテ陸軍ノ方評判悪シ
廣田内所ノ先程ノ説明ハ戒嚴令ヲ意味セラル、ヤ

(次頁へ續ク)

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木戸	否其ノ意ニハアラズ只國內津々浦々迄陸軍カ
米内	配備セラルト云フ意味ナリ
阿部	寺内元帥ハ如何
平沼	實現困難ト思ハルに即アリ
近衛	此、際、組閣ノ長口ヲコトハナクナリ
	東條内閣ハ何カ故ニ倒レタルガ陸軍カ不評
	ヲ買ヒ人心離反シタル爲ナリ 従フテ人心ヲ
	一新スル爲ニハ陸軍ハ從來、態ナラ変ヘル
	コトカ必要ナリ
平沼	各方面ノ希望ハ軍カ各方面ニ干渉スルコトヲ
	廢止スルコトナリ
近衛	十數年來陸軍内一部ニ左翼思想アリ
	今日軍官民ニ連係ヲトリ左翼革命ヲ
	企テントスルモノアリ 此ノ失敗敗戦以上ニ危險ニシ
	テ自分ハ敗戦ヨリモ左翼革命ヲ決心セルモノニシテ
	敗戦ハ皇室國體ヲ維持シ得ルモ革命ハ然ラ
	ザルヲ以テナリ 此ノ大ヨリ見テ陸軍大臣ノ選任カ
	重大ナリ
米内	其ノ其ナリハ陸軍ヨリ選ブガヨシ
若槻	其ノ其ハ從來ヨリ疑ヒ居タルト云ハナリ
平沼	金島同感ナリ
近衛	寺内ハ其ノ其押ヘ得ルヤ
阿部	寺内ハ直情徑行ナリガ元一カ元一ヨリ板ウコト
	ニ困難アルベシ

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阿部 軍、禦役アルモノナラバベカラズ
若親 宇垣ニハ軍、禦役ナキヤ
阿部 近況ヲ知ラズ
米内 阿部ザシ誰カ、禦役ヲ持ヘンモノハナキヤ
阿部 梅津等ハ人物ナリ其他ニミアルモ皆ハ所望ニ
届ク、實現困難ナリ
平沼 梅津氏ハ問題ニ出来ズ海軍ニ他ニ人ハナキヤ
米内 先般内府ノ云ハレタルトコロヨリ見レバ陸軍カラ出ス
方宜シカラシ
平沼 近衛公ノ云ハレシ左様ヲ押エルトハ、余程経験ヲ
要スベシ
近衛 世間デハ、鈴木貫太郎氏ヲ云フモノアリ
米内 之ハオヤリニナリ又方ガ宜シカラシ
平沼 個人ノ事情ハ免モ角、今日國家、爲ナレハ出ラ
ルニ至ルナラシ、自令ハヨリ知レバ立派ナ人ト思フ
米内 イヤ、國家、爲ヨリ見テ而カ云フナリ
広田 隠忍ナル人ト思フ
平沼 強ハトコロモアリ人ノ言ヲ容シ人ナリ
原 身モ、樞府ニテ一階ニ在リヲ爲ス所、ヨリ知レバ
鈴木氏ハ、常ニ自令ハ軍人ナレバ、政議的位、置ニハ
絶対ニ就カズ、後令大命アリトモ絶対ニ許受
セズト云ヘリ、余、參考、迄申ス
岡田 人トシテハ立派ナリガ、前線、將兵等ノコトヲ考ヘ
ルトキ、陸軍ノ方ガヨロシト思フ

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2/10

平沼
近衛
木戸
阿部
木戸
阿部
木戸
阿部
木戸
平沼
近衛
若槻
木戸
近衛
平沼
木戸
阿部
阿部
木戸

広田

平沼

広田

木戸

若槻

木戸

近衛

平沼

木戸

阿部

阿部

木戸

阿部

木戸

平沼

近衛

日本、制憲、根本ヲ改訂シテ行カネハナラ又様々重大
段階ト思フ總テハ大本營ニ列スルト云フコトニ
セザルベカラズ
コレハ、實ニ出来ヌコトナリ
戦争中一トシバ陸海軍、四本柱ガシツカリヌレバヨシ
吾内元帥等モ一人ナリ
今日五々ガ後ニ會合シ大命ガ一兩日下ラザレバ時ハ
人心不安ヲ起ス故ニ宇垣カ梅津大將カ宜シカラシ
畑元帥ハ如何
陸軍ヨリ出ルトスレバ先程申シタル様ニ人心ヲ新
爲ス、思ハシ改ムル、(不明)尤傾(不明)必要條件ナリ
之カ出来レバ梅津ニテモヨシ
政治ノ隆發アルコトガ必要ナリ
宇垣氏ニ對シ前線ヨリ、批判ハ如何ニ思ハルニヤ
敵側宣傳攻勢モアリ前線ニ不満ト動搖ヲ與フ
ルヨウデハ困ル
海軍案ハ小恙ナルヤ
大体ニ於テ陸軍案トスレバ人ノ問題ナリ
情況ガ許ヌナラバ吾内或ハ畑カ
一、吾内、二、梅津、三、畑ト云フ順序カ
梅津ニツイテハ總長ヲ拜命シタル許リナルコト、大臣ノ
経歴ヲ有セサルコト等ガ問題ナリ
氏ノ次ハ海軍、米内
鈴木貫太郎氏

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- 近衛 宇恒氏、由題ハ
- 平沼 昨今ヲ知ニ付
- 本戸 陸軍大將中其外ニ如何ナル人ナリヤ
- 阿部 本庄荒木、小磯等ナリ、其次、東條ト云フコト、ナリ
- 本戸 小磯ニ如何
- 米内 小磯ヨリナリ、小磯ヨリ腹マデ
- 近衛 言壇ヨリナリ、人ニモナリヤ
- 阿部 全然異ル
- 本戸 陸軍、現役方面ト、折合ニ如何
- 阿部 格別、トハナカルベシ、東條ト、性質異ル
- 平沼 人物、大キイ、敬神家ナリ
- 本戸 思想問題ニ、如何
- 若槻 人ヲ知ニ付、如何存ナリ
- 岡田 餘、如何モ米内、平沼、西岡、岡田、等ナリ、故、内閣下、御
- 近衛 意見ニ如何
- 友田 異存ナリ
- 阿部 //
- 岡田 之、直ニ皇國内閣ヲ實現、待リ、又、再検討ニ、要
- 之、直ニ重大ナル時ニ、一二時間、争フ、ト云フ、公、生、命、檢
- 討ニ、要
- 本戸 往年、元老大臣會議、如キ、皇臣大臣會議、宮中ニ、於テ、
- 御同僚、願フ、云フ、如キ、腹空ニ、有テ、居、目下、研究ニ、在リ
- 岡田 盟國ニ、對シ、之、要ニ、要
- 友田 勅命内閣陸海將主内閣、如何

7/012

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若觀 荷事以同元事安其朝禮禮人君之十一
木戶 原氏、亦其具、奉由奉主之六
木戶 候補有、順奉人無何
若觀 寺内 烟 少 鐵 海皇
平治 寺内 少 鐵 烟 海皇
常司 寺内 少 鐵 烟 尚 少 鐵 烟 皇 上 寺 内 奉 之 際 其 禮 會
平治 少 鐵 皇 上 寺 内 奉 之 際 其 禮 會
近衛 三人 上 奉 之
大田 寺内 少 鐵 烟
阿部 寺内 少 鐵 烟
岡田 三人 上 奉 之
木戶 全 國 奉 皇 上 寺 内 奉 之 際 其 禮 會 (三 寺 不 明)
會 臣 上 奉 皇 上 寺 内 奉 之 際 其 禮 會

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No. 13

若槻 首相候補に倒れしは様子を御覧す面白かりて本人が希望
スルハ六歳に合見スベシ
本戸 長時間の協議ヲ謝スモ意見ノアリタトコロに幸曲奏上スベシ
會議ヲ終ラセテ以テ直ニ退去スルニ於テ八時半に今ヨリ九時十五分迄拜
謁皇臣會議 模倣ヲ幸曲奏上ト尚第一候補タル寺内元帥、南
方軍總司令官ナル故三ヲ起用不作戦ニ又陣トモヤ否ヤニツイテハ統帥
部ニ豫メ所下問アリタリモ百ヲ言ハス 恰モ梅澤、新參謀總長親
補式舉行、烏ノ参内ニ来リ、東條參謀總長ニ武官長ヲ言フ等
スルコトトベシト、後談アリタリ
午後九時半分限召シ拜謁 在、如キ所談ヲ拜又
寺内元帥ヲ四三トニテ作戦上、關係ヲ東條總長ニ尋ヌタルニ總長左
ノ二点ニテ及ボセリ尤モ、コトトモ思フ故 小磯大將ヲビスコトニス
一反攻、苛烈ナル際第一線、總司令官ヲ一日ニテモアケルコトハ不可算
一内地、政治狀態ヲ前線ニ影響セシムルハ主眼ニ関シ面白かり
又東亞共榮圈ハ勿論其、他、中立國等ニ與リル影響モ甚大
ナル極力避ケタシ
依テ侍從長ヲ四三アリ、小磯大將既ニ、寺續ヲ取ル様所下命
相成度旨ヲ言ヒ退下ス
十時十分ヨリ十時三十五分迄所召ニヨリ拜謁ス 今親補式舉行
ノ除顔振ヲ見ルニ陸相ニ、結局東條ヲ居据ルト云フコトヲ示サザルカト
思フ如何ト、感想既漏セテ余トシテハ政治狀態ヨリ見ルトモ、
却テ面白カリザルコトトナル虞アル旨ヲ申セタ
斯ノテ十一時過歸宅 漸ク多食ヲ喫ス

1279

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 19 July 1944"

19 July, Wednesday. Fine.

At 2:30 A.M. Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi, at 8 Mr. ABE, Genki, and at 8:30 Mr. HIROSE visited me and each discussed the political situation.

At 10 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and consulted me about the Imperial message to the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

From 10:20 to 11:35 I was received in audience by His Majesty and reported on the political situation and on other matters.

At 1:00 Mr. KAYA visited me at my office and talked to me about the monetary policy towards China.

At 2 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and conferred with me regarding the Imperial message to Chief of Army General Staff TOJO.

At 3 Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA came to my office and told me about the circumstances of the change of government.

At 4 Director of the Police Bureau MACHIMURA came to my office and informed me of the conditions of peace and order, etc.

At 6 Prince KONOYE called on me at my home and asked me what I thought about making the next cabinet a coalition cabinet of KOISO and YONAI for the purpose of forming a true national unity cabinet, adding that Baron HIRANUMA had also agreed. As I had been feeling the need of taking some steps to put up a united front, I agreed to the idea, and at 6:30 called in Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA and asked him to find out the views of other elder statesmen before tomorrow morning.

INOUE, Goro came and stayed for the night.

0811280

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Ex 1279

木戸侯日記ヨリ、抜萃

昭和十九年七月十九日 晴

午前六時半 鈴木貞一氏 八時 安倍源基氏 八時半 廣瀬氏
 来訪 何レモ改情ニツイテ話アリタリ。
 十時 武官長来室 閣中 軍司令官へ、勅語ニツイテ協議ヲ受テ
 十時二十分ヨリ十一時三十五分迄 拜謁 改情等ニツイテ言上
 一時 賀屋氏来廳 对支店 幣改等ニツイテ話アリタリ
 二時 武官長来室 中 條總長ニ対スル勅語ニツイテ協議ヲ受テ
 三時 松平官相来室 改変事情ヲ語ル
 四時 所村敬保局長来室 治安状況等ヲ聴ク
 六時 近衛公来邸 次期内閣ヲ真、舉國一致内閣ヲ云々ト
 爲メ小磯米内、聯立内閣トシテ、如何ト話アリ。平沼男モ
 賛成アリトコトナリ。余モ亦舉國態勢ヲ整フル爲メ何事
 カ、午ヲ打ツ必要ヲ感シ居リシ故 賛成シ六時半 松平官
 長ヲ招キ他、重臣ノ意向ヲ 今夜中ニ聴取スル様依頼ス
 井上五郎君来泊

FILE COPY
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

"ENTRY FROM MARQUIS KIDO'S DIARY, 20 July 1944"

20 July, Thursday. Cloudy and fine.

At 8 a.m. Mr. HIROSE, and at 8:30 Mr. FUJIYAMA, Aichiro called on me and gave me information.

Chief Secretary MITSUDAIRA called on me at 9 and reported the views of each senior statesman. General ABE telephoned me that he could not agree.

From 10:55 to 11:23 I was received in audience by the Emperor and reported in detail the plan for the coalition with YONAI whereupon the plan was accepted. Came home at noon. Accompanied MIKO and CHIKAYOSHI to Tokyo Station on my way to the Palace. Was received in audience from 2:55 to 3:20.

Conference of Senior Statesmen reconvened at 4, and I fully explained the development regarding the coalition. General ABE also revoked his disapproval.

At 4:15 Governor-General KOISO arrived from Korea and immediately came to the Palace. I explained in detail the political situation leading to the resignation en bloc.

I was received in audience from 4:50 to 4:58 and reported to the Throne until I asked his Majesty to summon KOISO and YONAI.

General KOISO and Admiral YONAI were received in audience at the Imperial Study at 5:10. His Majesty gave his message, "Subjects, form a cabinet in cooperation", telling them to observe the text of the Constitution, and to handle the affairs so as not to irritate the Soviet in order that the Greater East Asia War might be accomplished.

As it was also General KOISO's wish, at 5:30 I took the General and the Admiral to a place where the senior statesmen were meeting and brought them together.

I was received in audience from 5:50 to 6:05. Prince KONOYE came to my office at 6:10 and we had a talk. At 7:30 General KOISO called on me at my home and told me about his discussion with Premier TOJO and Chief of Army General Staff UMEZU.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Entry from Margus KIDO's Diary, 4 April 1945

4 April Wednesday Rain

Alarm at 12:30 A.M. Air-raid from 1 to 4:30
The use of a rather large number of time bombs was the
characteristic of this raid.

Went to the GUNDO / T.M. laterally "Imperial
Library" but it actually means underground rooms
built for air-raid shelter / at 1:10 to attend to my
work. Came home at 5.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library
from 10:55 to 11:25, and was told by His Majesty of
what he told Koiso in regard to the NIV-Pin matter.
I cannot understand the Premier's attitude, his lack
of confidence in himself.

Visited the Chief-Aide-de-Camp in his room and
told him of my intention in case of a political change
to meet with the two Chiefs of Staff as well as with
the two Ministers / T.M. War and Navy / and asked him to
exert his good offices for it.

At 2 o'clock, Premier KOISO came to the office
and talked as per the separate sheet.

At 2:30, NAGAHARA, Governor of NIIGATA Prefecture
came to the office for a talk.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library
from 2:45 to 3:05, and reported to the Throne Premier
KOISO's intention to resign from office.

Visited the Grand Chamberlain at 3:15 to discuss
with him the question of the mass resignation of the
cabinet.

At 3:30, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my
room and informed me of the details of his talk with
the Premier regarding the NIV matter.

Came home at 5. KOHDO left for SOYAMA.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

/T.H. - Separate Sheet/

4 April 1945

At 2 P.M. Premier KOISO came to the office and talked to the following effect.

"/As I have previously discussed with you, I am of the opinion that, in the war situation of today the present organization and character of the government as the highest national organ are by no means, good. That is why, with the Emperor's permission, I was admitted to Imperial Headquarters. I have also given my opinion /T.H. there/ concerning the direction of the war but to little avail. From now on, we must have, at any cost, an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet or cabinet which will direct the war. Toward the end of last month, therefore, I talked with YONAI and we discussed the matter from various standpoints. We could think of a reform, but whether we should have it or not was a matter of doubt as we have never known of a cabinet being strengthened by reform. In fact, I informed His Majesty of this question at the end of last month. I had also thought at that time of opening the second Greater East Asia Conference in the middle of the month. Also in view of the war situation in OKINAWA, I had been thinking of deciding on my stop at about the end of the month. However, not only has the second Greater East Asia Conference come to be suspended (a meeting of Ambassadors is now under consideration in its place) but also it is likely that the war in OKINAWA may take several months more. Meanwhile it happens that in the Army Marshal SUOITAMA and Marshal HATA have been decided upon to go out as Commander-in-Chief in order to strengthen the defense structure. Accordingly, the Army is going to recommend General AHAMI to the Throne as War Minister and I hear that the Army wants to realize the above plan by about the 6th. Such being the case, it would not be fair to recognize this change now and then carryout the mass resignation at the end of the month."/

Therefore, upon consultation with Navy Minister YONAI today, a resignation en bloc is desired for the reasons given in the separate sheet.

Then I asked KOISO when he proposed to do this. He answered that if it suited the Emperor, he was thinking of having a special cabinet meeting today to gather the letters of resignation, but I suggested that he had better do so tomorrow morning as there would be no time for His Majesty to consider the question if it happened too suddenly. KOISO agreed with me.

Was received in audience at 2:45 and reported the matter to the Throne. I stated that this time the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would like to see the Ministers of the Army and Navy and the two Chiefs of Staff prior to the Senior Statesmen's Conference, and received the Emperor's permission.

/Z.H. Text of Kato's reasons for resigning/

Since we are convinced that at this moment when the situation of the Empire is getting more and more urgent, with changes on both political and war fronts east and west, and when there should exist no discrimination between the battlefield and the home front or between the Supreme Command and the Civil Government a fundamental change should be made in the organization and character of the cabinet so that they may cope with the present situation and so that the cabinet, together with the whole nation with renewed resolution may be powerful enough to go straight forward for the accomplishment of the great task of assisting the Throne. To this end we have decided to ask permission of the Emperor to tender our resignation and carry out a resignation en bloc.

Doc/632W(17)

五時五十分迄拜謁 小磯首相ニ仰マシ可然日言ヒス
退去ガ々藤田侍従長ニ在、事情ヲ説明ス
午後外出シタル小磯和子兩人、メ方歸リ来リ夕食ヲ共ニ
孝孝女郎和子ハ八時過連立キテ歸途ニ就ク
和子ハ十二時半迄汽車ニテ塩山ニ歸ル

(昭和三十年四月四日)

四月四日 水 雨
午前十時半警報一時ヨリ四時半迄空襲警報ナル今回
一時限爆弾相当多数用ヒツタルカ特長ナリ
一時十分御文庫ニ出立立時歸定ス
十時五十分ヨリ十一時三十分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁
繆武、件ニツキ小磯首相ニ御話ノ模様ヲ承ル首
相、確信ナキ態度不可解ナリ
一時四十分武官長ヲ居室ニ訪ニ萬一收領及等、
場合西總長西大臣ニ面談ノ意向ヲ傳(幹旋ヲ依
頼ス
二時小磯首相来室別紙、セキ話アリ
二時半野村新瀉縣知事来室面談
二時四十分ヨリ三時五十分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁小磯首
相、詳意ヲ言ヒス
三時十五分侍従長ヲ訪ニ内閣總辭職、件ニツキ
連絡ス
三時半重光外相来室繆、件ニツキテ首相ト話
タル迄三時半迄アリ
五時歸リ天信田カ君宅山ニ出立ス

6x 12A

no 1

Doc/1632W(171)

ニ。別紙

午後二時の機曾相来室在、ヤキ話アリタリ
豫テ御相談ヲ致セラントナルガ戦局今日ノ状況ニ於テ
國家最高機關トシテ政府ノ組織性格ハトウシテモ
以テ儘テハイケナイト思フソコニ御許ヲ得テ大本營
ニ引スルコトニモナリ戦争指導ニハ自今モ意見ヲ云
フテモ見タガトモ充分トハ行ハナイトウシテモ之カハ
大本營内閣戦争指導機關ヲナケレバイケナイハコト
先月、末頃米内トモ話テ改造ト云フコトモ考ヘラレ
カ改造ニテ強代ナシテ試カナカラフ之モ考ヘモハト
種々話合ハタス夫ハ先月末ニ陛下ニモ御話申上タ
第ナリタリ時、第二回大東亞會議ヲ中旬ニ開催
スルコト云フ考ヘモアリ沖繩、戦況等ニ鑑ミ月末迄
ニハ進退ヲ決シタリト云フニ居テコトコ第ニ
回大東亞會議ハ中止スルコトナリ(之ニ代ル大使會議
ハ目下研究中)タルノミナリス沖繩、戦況モ数ヶ月ヲ
要スルヤ天知ラズ偶々陸軍ニ於テハ防衛態勢強化、
爲メ杉山畑元帥カ總司令官トシテ出ルコトナリ
從テ阿南大將ヲ陸相ニ奏請スルトノコトナリ
今日頃ニハ實現シタリト、スゴクアタタシスルト今
此ノ交渉ヲ認メテソウトテ月末ニ總辭職スルハ如何ニ
モ裏切リ様ナリトナルト今日米内海相トモ相
談、上別紙様ナリ理由ニヨリ總辭職シタリト云
ナリヤ

No 2

Doc 1632 W(17)

ヨウテ何時決行せらるルヤト問じしニ御都合次第ニテハ
今日臨時閣議ヲ開キ辞表ヲ取纏メ撥カトノコトナ
リシ故餘リ大然 御上ノ侍考ノ遊ニ、時間モ
ナキ故明朝トせしニ、如何ト話ノ同意ヲ得タリ
ヨウテ二時四十五分拜謁右、趣テ奏上ス尚今同ニ重
臣、會同ニ先ノ内大臣ニ於テ陸海兩大臣兩總長
ト會見致展旨ヲ言上御許シテ得タリ

東西政戰両局、要轉ニ伴ニ皇國ノ事勢益々危
急ヲ加ヘ今ヤ戰線ヲ鋭後ニ又統帥ヲ國務ヲ正ニ
差別ナカラストスルノ秋内閣ノ組織性格ヲ亦此等
態ニ適應スルカ如ク抜本的放棄ヲ加ヘ萬民ト生
ニ士氣ヲ新ニシテ輔弼ノ大任ニ充テ遂ニ邁進スルニ
力ナシテ天ノヲラサルノ力ヲ自覺シ謹ミテ骸骨
ヲ之ニ奉リ總辭職ヲ決行スルコトナリ

No 3

0.4.5 /T.N. Probably April 5th/

Interviewed Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55 A.M. In general, I asked him the same thing I inquired of Chief of the General Staff UMEZU. His conclusion was that although it is called a powerful cabinet, nothing in particular could be thought of. Since Navy Minister YONAI is one of the senior statesman /JUSHIN/ I took this opportunity to ask his opinions regarding the succeeding premier. He approved of Admiral Kantaro SUZUKI.

Furthermore, regarding the successor to the Naval Minister, he confided to me that since Vice-Admiral Seibi INOUE would not accept by all means, he decided to recommend Admiral HASEGAWA.

Interviewed War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1:00 P.M. In general, I said the same thing I inquired of the Chief of General Staff UMEZU.

The War Minister said that viewed from his own experience, the unification of supreme command and state affairs with one man holding concurrently several posts, it cannot, factually, produce results. It is impossible. The perspective of war is extremely difficult as seen from the shortages in material and the difficulties of transportation. It could be surmised that the U.S.S.R. may loudly make proposal for peace after she defeats Germany. I think it is necessary for us to make preparations beforehand with consideration to the effect whether the U.S.S.R. would attempt it independently or together with Britain and the U.S. at this opportune moment when the war situation is favourable (the OKINAWA Operation) or at an unfavourable moment when she may attempt it independently or in combination. UMEZU is the best qualified person for the succeeding Premier from the Army.

At 2:00 P.M., I had an interview with OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff. Questions I asked him were about the same as that asked of UMEZU, Chief of the Army General Staff.

OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff registered shock upon hearing of the resignation of the cabinet and so forth, and frankly stated that it was bad at such a critical time. Speaking about the future prospect of the war, he stated that up to about the NARITANA Line, although the difference in strength between our forces and that of the enemy was considerable, nevertheless, we fought a regular war. However, it was later continued under guerrilla warfare. That it was a big stake can also be said.

TOJO: Frequent changing of cabinets in war time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference on April 25 is especially the most important period. The cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first.

1. OKADA: The new cabinet to be formed must consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the very end and a cabinet that will solidly combine the total power of the country. Such a problem as war or peace can be determined only at a later stage. I believe we must first carefully study these problems before determining this question.

HIRANUMA: As their Excellencies have said, the acute war situation today has given rise to various opinions which must be unified. There is no way out but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is simple. Frankly, I am bewildered because of this sudden political change and it would have been desirable not to have replied to the Throne immediately as in previous cases. I wish we could also have heard carefully, if possible, the opinions of Ministers KOISO and YONAI but since the resignations /1.58/ have been tendered /T.N.--word "tendered" obliterated/ it is too late. Frankly, since my opinions are being presented without any preparation, I do not have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I suggest that we carefully discuss such problems as their Excellencies have presented.

KIDO: I am quite of the same opinion. The fact is that for a time it appeared as if a total resignation would occur but I heard thereafter that it was changed to the policy of reorganizing and both Field Marshals, SUGIYAMA and HATA, were to be transferred to the posts of Commanders-in-Chief of the General Defence Commands. Accompanying this, it became necessary to change the War Minister, and therefore, the Army offered to the cabinet, General ANAMI as its successor. Premier KOISO states that to effect reorganization now and then to execute a total resignation a little later on would be betraying the Army. (Personally I do not know what is meant by this.) So that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is really so sudden and I, myself, am much perplexed.

KIDO: As Mr. HIRANUMA says, it means that after the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes a recommendation to the Emperor, he must not interfere with the organization of the cabinet. It is very strange that if the organization of the cabinet is unsatisfactory, he who made the recommendation will be held responsible. Therefore, I think that as a system it is poor. However, at the present time, there is no alternative, and therefore, we cannot help but be resigned to accept this system.

HIRANUMA: I think that it is unreasonable that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, and that we must also share the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is best that the one who organizes a cabinet should seek more advice.

OKADA: Some people say that considerable surplus power still exists in our country and ask why we do not utilize this potential fighting power. Before amassing the total power of military officials, government officials, and civilians, unity among the leaders is strongly desired. It is necessary that we study as to whether the procedure we have followed until today, is right or wrong.

HIRANUMA: After the decision is made in this room and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes an informal report to the Throne, a situation would develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him to do as he pleases, I wonder.

KONOYE: Although you are right, the problem is in what form it should be carried out.

KIDO: There are many who desire a firmer unity among the leaders.

HIRANUMA: Setting aside discussions from the legislative and constitutional standpoints, I think it is better to have closer contact in the organization of the cabinet since the responsibility must be assumed.

OKADA: I agree.

SUZUKI: I think that there is no necessity of fixing a limit on the scope of the Emperor's summons. I would like to ask the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that whenever the occasion demanded, Prince SAIONJI sought the advices of Count YAMAMOTO and Fleet-Admiral TOGO. After obtaining the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views of Count MAKINO?

HIRANUMA: At the least, he must be in the first or second reserve.

SUZUKI: At the time of the Sino-Japanese War we had Premier ITO. The Premier need not always be a soldier.

HIRANUMA: Practically speaking, the Premier will not understand war, unless he was a soldier at least in the first or second reserve. Nevertheless, the premise is that, if it is to be fought, it must be fought out.

OKADA: Through the conversations carried until now, it seems that the character of the Premier, in general, is distinctive.

KONOYE: Then we may conclude that he must be a soldier either in the first or second reserve who will fight it out.

HIRANUMA: I hope no one will say that it is improper at this time, such as said by Mr. WAKATSUKI.

WAKATSUKI: Actually, I am unqualified. I fear that I may say something thoughtless. The question is not of a man who will fight it out to a final victory. If we propose peace now, it will evidently lead to unconditional surrender.

HIRANUMA: From the relations between supreme command and state affairs, I think, we need a man from the Army or the Navy, but not necessarily in active service.

WAKATSUKI: The fundamental principle has been clarified but how about its application?

HIRANUMA: What is Prince KONOYE's opinion?

KONOYE: A person that has had no connection hitherto should be recommended.

HIRANUMA: It must be necessary that the person has had no connection and that he can be relied upon, as seen from the public and people.

WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, it was decided to be from the Army and although a certain person was named, he was not selected. Today, it can be either from the Army or Navy. What is your opinion, Mr. OKADA?

OKADA: My mental vision is also narrow but gathered here are men from a wide field so a competent man can be selected.

WAKATSUKI: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal approve of this measure?

KIDO: Yes.

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion?

KIDO: In the first place, since it is my duty here to listen to your opinions, I wish you would state your unreserved opinions. What is your opinion Mr. SUZUKI?

SUZUKI: How would it be if the hitherto Senior Statesmen make an effort. We have the responsibility and are prepared to die for the country. The resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessary. Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the youngest. After that, we all will try. How about the four trying first? I have heard that previously President /of the Privy Council/ HARA also made this suggestion. A week before the former President /of the Privy Council/ died, I intimately heard him talk on this subject and I recall being greatly impressed. I suggest he accept by all means.

KONOYE: Then it differs from aforementioned fundamental principle.

HIRANUMA: The candidate should be a military man. I also agree with Prince KONOYE in that the new premier should be one with no previous connections. With the purport of winning the confidence of the people in mind, it is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the premiership. As in the past, shall we appoint him after consulting him? In the present situation, is this procedure proper or is it not? I think it is proper to have him appointed by submitting the Ministerial Scroll to His Majesty without consulting him.

WAKATSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?

HIROTA: That is, there is no need of having the consent of the person himself.

1632W(118)

No. 1

木戸侯日記ヨリ、抜萃

昭和三十年四月五日

四月五日 木 晴

午前十時半 小磯首相参内 辞表ヲ捧呈ス

十時四十五分ヨリ同五十五分迄 拜謁 小磯首相、辞表ヲ拝見ス

十二時 小磯首相末室 発表、時期等ニツキ 打合セ 大体午後七時、
ニースト云フコトス

豫テ 武官長ト 打合セタル 通り 十一時三十五分 梅津参謀總長、

十一時五十五分 米内海相 一時 杉山陸相 二時 及リ 軍令部總長ト 別紙、
通り 面談ス

十二時五十五分 警戒 警報 発令セラル

二時五十五分ヨリ 三時十五分迄 御文庫ニテ 拜謁

三時三十分 岡田大將 末室 面談

五時ヨリ 八時迄 拜謁、同ヲ 拜借 重臣會議ヲ 催ス 若槻男、汽車 延
着、為メ 午後六時ヨリ 参加セラル

終了後 御説メヲ 頂戴ス

八時半 鈴木 杞相ト 懇談ス

八時四十五分ヨリ 九時十五分迄 拜謁 (御文庫) 重臣ノ 意向ヲ 詳細
言上 鈴木 貴太郎 方ニ 大命ヲ 降サシ 可然 思量スル 旨 奉答ス

十時 鈴木 大將ニ 大命 降下 拜受、上 末室 經ニ 懇談ス 十一時半 歸
宅

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

二〇、四、五

午前十一時半梅津參謀總長來訪ヲ求メ左ノ通り會見ス

本日小磯首相辭表ヲ呈セラレタルガ其理由ハ戰局ノ現狀ニ鑑ミ内閣ノ組織性格ヲ改變シ強力ナルモノヲシメサルベカラスト云フニアリ損言スレバ大本營内閣或ハ戰事ノ指導内閣ナラザルベカラスト云フニアリ此ノ點ニツキ統帥部トシテ何カ御考ヘ御希望ガアルナレハ何ヒタシ尙戰事ノ見透独乙ノ崩壞桑港會議ニヨル政治攻勢方等ヲ目標トシテ御考ヘモ伺ヒタシ

一、戰事ノ見透ハ沖繩モ中々ノ苦戰デアリ見透ハ決シテ良好トハ云ヘサルモ彼ノ敵ヲ擊攘シ得ルト否トニ拘ハラズ飽迄戰フノ態執力ニテ進マサルベカラズ又此事ハ國民ノ志氣昂揚セラレ金力ヲ發揮シ得レバ容易ニハアラサルモ不可能トハ思ハズ此點ハ軍トシテ着々進メツツアリ依ツテ之ニ要求ニ適合スルカ如キ内閣ノ組織セラレンコトヲ切望スソレニハ前大戦ノ際各國ノ採リタル戰時内閣小數内閣制ヲ採用スルモ一案ナラン而シ要ハ人ナリ

一、大本營内閣戰事指導内閣等ハ一應考ヘラル、モ統帥ト國務ヲ一纏ニスルト云フコトハ困難ナリ

一、油ガ一番心配ナルガ數ヶ月ハアリ目下御許ヲ得テ特殊ノ隊ヲ編成シ内地ニテ振ルフトトセリ現在ノ倍位増産シタシ

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二〇・四・五・

午前十一時五十分米内海相ト面談

大体梅津總長ニ尋ネタルト同様ノコトヲ尋ヌ、強力内閣ト云フモ別ニ特別ナルコトハ考ヘラレズトノ結論ナリ米内海相ハ重臣ノ一人ナル故此機会ニ後継首班ニツキ考ヘテ聽ク鈴木實太郎大將ニハ賛成ナリキ
尚海軍大臣ノ後任ニハ平上成美中將カドウシテモ受ケナイ故長谷川大將ヲ推ストセリトノ内話アリタリ

午後一時杉山陸相ト会談

大体梅津總長ニ尋ネタルト同様ノコトヲ述ブ

陸相ハ自己ノ体験ヨリ見テモ一人力數役ヲ兼ネタル統帥ト國務院統合ハ多実實績擧ラズ不可ナリ。

戦争ノ見透ハ物ノ不足輸送難等ヨリ見テ頗ル困難ナリ蘇聯カ独ヲ倒シタル後ハ大キク平和提唱ヲナスニアラズヤトモ考ヘラル之ヲ單獨テヤルカ、英米ト共ニヤルカ此機會ニ處シテノ戦局ノ良好ナル場合(沖繩作戰等)ニ悪キ場合 單獨ノ場合連合セル場合等ヲ考慮ニ入レ豫メ進下備スルノ要アリト思フ、

陸軍カラノ後継首班ハ梅津カ最適任ナリ

午後二時及リ軍令部總長ト面談

梅津總長ニ話シタルト大体同様ノコトヲ尋ヌ

及リ總長ハ内閣總辭職云々ヲ聽キタルトキハ卒直ニ申セバ大事ナ時ニ困ツタコトタトシヨツクヲ受ケタリ。

戦争ノ見透ヲ云ヘバ大体マリアナ線迄ハ彼我ノ勢力ノ差ハ相違アリシモ兎モ角モ正戦ナリシカ其後ハ奇戦(ケリラ)ノ連續ナリ、從ツテ

No. 3

1632W(118)

大キテ賭博トモ云ヘル。沖繩ノ戦争ニシテモ辛ニ追落シ得テモソレデ
終了スルモノハナイ再ビ同地ニ来リ或ハ他ニ向フカ何レニシテモ戦局ハ
更ニ深刻トフルベシ戦力ノ維持ニツイテハ過早ニ実行スルト却ツテ逆效
果トナルヲ以テ時期ヲ見ツツアルカ將來ハ海軍ノ餘ル兵ヲ工場ニ入レ
テ力ヲ維持シ航空機月産千二百機水艦月二十隻ハ維持シテ奇戦的
勢力ノ發揮ニ努ムル考ヘテ勿論樂觀出来サルモノウ悲觀シタモ、
ニアラス但シ而シ之ニハ條件アリ即チ吾國國民ノ信賴アル内閣ガ之ヲ後
ヨリバックスルナリ。

油ハ六月位迄ハアリ其後ハ松根油等ニヨルナリ今後ハ国内態勢ノ
崩ルコトガ心配ナリ

大本營一本ノ内閣ト云フモ戦争モ政治モヤルト云フコトハ中々難カシク思
ハル。戦争遂行ニハ今ノ形カ一番ヨイ様ニ思ハル。

昭和三十年四月五日午後五時ヨリ表拝謁向ニテ重臣會議ヲ開催ス
近衛、平沼、鈴木、廣田

木下、若槻、岡田、東條(若槻男ハ六時ヨリ参加セラル)

一侍從長挨拶—内大臣ヨリ政変ニ至リタル事情ヲ説明小磯首相、
辞表ヲ朗讀因取見ス

一東條辞表ニハ國務統帥何レモ是正ヲ要ストアリ此ノ意味ハ如何

一木下小磯首相ヨリハ別段ノ説明ナカリキ

一東條 戦時中一層々内閣ノ交迭スルハ宜シカラス殊ニ四月三十五日來港
會議カ重大ナル時期ト思フ。今度ノ内閣ハ最後ノ内閣ナリケレバナラヌ
處ヲ今國內ニ最後迄戦イ抜イテ國ノ將來ヲ南クベシトスル説ト無
條件降服ヲモ甘受シテ早急ニ和平ヲ作り出スベシトノ論アリ先ツ之ヲ
先決スルノ要アリト思フ

No. 4

一、岡田今度出来ル内閣ハ非常ニ種々ノコトヲ考ヘハカルベカラズ最後迄
 國ノ運命ヲ背負フ内閣ナリ國ノ總力ヲ結集スル内閣ナル和戰兩用
 ト云フカ如キ問題ハモウ少し先ニ行カサレハ判ラヌソレ等ノ事ヲ充分
 研究ノ上決メサケレバナラヌト思フ

一、平沼兩閣下ト同様戦局切迫セル今日國內ニハ種々ノ論アリ之ヲ歸一
 セシムル要アリ。飽迄戦ヲ以外ニ途ナシ問題ハ簡單ト考フ餘リ突然ノ
 政変ニテ實ハ当惑シテ居ルノ下從來ノ様ニ急ニ答ト云フコトニナ
 ラス様ニシタクリシナリ出来得レバ小磯米内兩大臣ノ意見ヲモセ分ニ
 聽キタクリシカ既ニ辭表ノ數字不明以上ハ不得止カ露骨ニ云ヘバ何レモ
 トッサノ内ニ意見ヲ述フル故充分ニ數字不明討ハスノ餘地ナシ。兩閣下
 ノ述ヘラレシ様ナ点ヲ充分ニ話合ヒタキモノナリ

一、不戸金ヲ御同惑ナリ實ハ一時ハ總辭職ノ様様モアリシニ其後改造ノ方針
 ニ変更セラレタル様反聞シ居リタルニ防衛總司令官ニ杉山畑兩元帥カ
 轉出セラルハコトナリ之ニ伴ヒ陸相交代ノ必要生シタルメ阿南大將ヲ
 後任トシテ陸軍ヨリ内閣へ申出タリ小磯首相ハ今此ノ改造ヲナシ内モナ
 ク總辭職ヲナスト云フコトハ陸軍ヲ裏切ルコトナル(此ノ意味ハ自分
 ニハ判ラス)カ故ニ急ニ決意セリトコトデアツテ全ク突発的ニ自分モ
 頗ル当惑セシ次ナリ

一、岡田誰々ト云フ前ニ總力結集強力内閣ニツイテ話合フテハ如何

一、平沼從來ハ首相カ先ツ定マリ其ノ首相カ閣僚ヲ奏請スルコトナリ
 居ルカ今度ハ主ナル閣僚位ハ決定セサレハ強力ナルモノトハナラサルヘシ
 陸海軍治安等在来ノ例ニヨリテハ結論ニ到達セサルヘシ

一、東條閣僚ヲ吾々カ定メルトキハ組閣後ノ責任ヲ陛下カオトリニナルト
 云フコトトナルニアラサルカ

一 平沼陛下カ直接御命シナリテハ宜シカラス

一 東條組閣ノ善悪カ陛下ニ歸スルコトハ避ケタシ

一 平沼形カラ云ハハ御説通りナルカ自分ハモウ少し吾々ノ意見ヲモ微シテ決メラレテハ如何ト云フナリ

一 廣田ドウシテモ勝ツカルヘカラス悲觀論モアルモ今四ノ戦争ハ各國トモ始メヨリ勝ち通シタルモノナク皆一度ハ敗ケケテモリ返ヘセルナリ。次ノ内閣ハ戦ニ勝抜ク為メノ内閣ナラザルベカラズ。内大臣カ軍部ノ首腦者ト会見セラレタルハ誠ニ至善ナル処置ト思フカ今少し軍部ノ意向ヲ確カムルノ要アルニアラズヤ

木戸相モ寧ネタルカ特殊ノ意見ハナカリキ

平沼露骨ニ云ハハ小磯氏ノ組閣ハ失敗ト思フ。モウ少し吾々ニモ相談ヘカリシナラン。改造ハ皆露骨ニ云ハハ失敗ナリ形ノ論ハ東條閣下ノ云ハル通ナルカ實際ハモウ少し理屈ニトラハス相談アリテ然ルヘキカ

木戸平沼サンノ云ハルハ、通り内大臣モ奏請スルト後ノ組閣ニハ口ヲ出スナト云フコトアリ而モ之カマスイト奏請ノ責任ヲ云ミサレルノハ誠ニ妙ナモノニ制度トシテモ之ヲハイケナイト思フカ今日ハ外ニ方法カナイノテ不得止実行サレテ居ルト云フ外ナシ

平沼内大臣一人ニ責任ヲトラスノハ無理ヲ吾々モ責任ヲ別タサルベカラズト思フソレハ組閣者モモット充分相談セラル、ガ宜シカラント思フ

岡田世間ニハ未カ我國ニハ相当餘カハアル此ノ残サレル戦力ヲテ使ハスカトノ論アリ軍官民ノ總力結集ノ前ニ上層部ノ一致ノ要カ切望セラル今迄ノヤリ方ニテ宜シキヤ否ヤ検討ヲ要スヘシ

平沼此席ヲ決定シ内大臣カ内奏セラレタル後ハ口ヲ出セヌト云フコトナシル御勝手ニオヤリナサイニテハ如何ト思フ

No. 7

1632W(118)

近衛御元がトウ云フ形テスルカ、問題ナリ

本ヤ、二層クモット一致セヨト、聲ハ随分アル

平沼、法湖上憲法上ノ論ハ別トシテ、責任ヲトウガハベカラザル以上モ、
少シ組織ニ当リテモ、取合ハル連絡ガアリテモ宜シカラシ

周田然リ

一鈴木、内大臣ニ御尋ネシタイガ、一体御召ニル範圍ハ、必シモ固定スル、
要ナキト云フ西園寺公博モ、時ニ應ジ山本伯ヤ東郷元帥ノ意見
等モ聴ケラフトノアル様ニ記憶ス此際御思召ラ拜シ牧野伯、
意見ヲ徴サシテ如何

本戸御説ハ御元ナルカ今日ヤリ方ハ西園寺公ノ時トハ異ツテ居ル、
テ數モ不明

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先王角毛(度)金幅(御信頼)下(國政全般)當ニシタル人々ヲ以テ(數々不明)
ニ様事ト思召伺ニ決定ニタルコトトシ今直ニ參照ナレトハ出キタ
一廣田(層部)ニ致(誠)必要ニ牧野伯(如キモ參照ナルカ)宜シカニト思フ
内閣(が替)ニ場合最高戦争指導會議(尚存續スルモノ)又首相(が)大本
營(列)ニト古(小磯)文(御許)ニシトナリ或(今後)内閣總理大臣(が)常
列(得ル)コトナレニヤ

一木戸(最高)戦争指導會議(首相)大本營(參列)スル以上(不必要ナリト)論現
ニテ之(將)未(考)定セラル(タ)問題トシ(次)問題(詳細)知ラサル(今後)内閣
總理大臣(參列)得ルモノト考フ

一東條(首相)推挙(參照)者トシ(參照)スルモノニ(國防)用兵(立)会ナリ

一鈴木(牧野)伯(御説明)ヨリ判(リ)タル(只)牧野伯(加)ルトキ(其)範圍(不明)瞭
ナルトコトハナク(牧野)伯(同様)參照(者)ハ(地)ナシト思フ(又)申(四)直

一若槻(持)表(意味)判(リ)又(後)段(素)ル(内閣)性格(速)ニ(參照)程(表)ナリ

一近衛(事)餘(突然)ニ(考)モ(東條)閣下(御説)統帥部(居)ラナイ此
場(何)レトモ(ナ)ラナイト思フ(コト)前(國)時(同様)先(軍)人(ナ)サルカラ
陸軍(海軍)軍(範圍)段々(狭)キ行(ク)如何

一東條(言)テ(決定)ス(コト)古(ハ)ニ(陛下)御(構)材料(供)奉(ル)意味ナリ

一若槻(御)召(ナ)ル御(趣)旨(後)繼(内閣)首班(選)定セ(コト)古(コト)東條(モ)不明
ナルカ如キコト(論)議スル(御)召(趣)旨(反)スト思フ(最後)迄(戦)力(中)途(解)
平(カ)ニ(論)議スル(問題)外(ナ)リ行(過)ト思フ

鈴木(今)若槻(御説)ナルカ(今日)バ(迄)モ(戦争)戰(後)キ(ナ)レバ(又)ソ(ガ)失(決)
ト思フ(即)後(繼)内閣(首班)其(意思)有(ル)モノ(ナ)レバ(不)適(當)ナリト思フ

若槻(ニ)ミテ(意)見(古)ト(風)ニ(考)タナリ

東條(ハ)ソ(ク)ナリ(前)提(ト)シ(意味)ナリ

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本内地々々戰場トナリトスル會情勢ニ於テ國內實情ハ甚ク憂之モ
國民ハ必シモ政府政策ニ熱心ナル協力ヲスズ所謂不ウ向ニ居ルト云
糧食問題生産増強問題治平問題等ヨリ見テ今度ハ眞ニ國民信頼
スル内閣ヲ作シカルヘラス昨今反黨的動向相當現ハル居ルコトモ爲
ニカルトモヨリト思フ要治有カナル臣僚陛下ニ對シ奉リ責任トルコト
考ナリ

一若槻自今當テ首相トシヨリ既ニ二十年ヲ經過シ居ル此頃人ハ一向知ラ
全ク其ノ位ニ堪ヘタルコトヲ痛感ス居リ眞ニ恐懼ノ至リナリ責任ハ如何
此ノ務ハ最モ自介ノ不適任ナリト思フコト此制度自身ニテモ老成ヲ願
平治男ハ此ノ様ニシキハ(主要關係ヲ豫メ選定)首班ハ皆御辭退スル外ナ
出サザルニトナルヘシ首班ハ身動キ出サザルニトナル

小磯首相ノ辭表ヲ趣旨ハ實現出来ルヤ否自今ハ意見述ヘテハ折衝開
府モ國務ト統帥ヲ中心ニ考ヘシメハ軍人ヲ宜シキニトスヤ漸次進
カハ様ニ進ミテ如何

若槻氏ハ前圓ニ自介カニシタルコトハ此ノ辭表ハ主目カ違フ

小磯首相ノ考ヘテ述ヘタルニ必シモ之ニトナルノ要ナリ

一廣田陸海軍大臣ノ何レカハ首班トナカ可ナリ

一平治國內ニ戦争終結ニキニ據ル考アリ以テ際ハ戦ハ投メナリナルカ
打ガリ和ヲ論者ハ推選スル能ハス以テ意味ニ首班人選ハ重大ノ關係ナリ

結局首相ヲ定ムベシ後其人ハ任ストニテ其意見ハ述ヘテハ戦争打ガリ和
論ハ極力反對ナリ形式的ニ若槻氏ノ云ハル通りナルモ事實ハ別ニカ
總力登壇ニ民間ノ有力者ヲ使ハサルヘカニス

一木戸民間ノ者カイツキ末ニ據ル態勢ヲトナサルヘカニス

一平治國務ト統帥ノ關係ヲ見テ現役トナサルヘカニトノ要ナリヤ

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- 一 広田 矢張現役ヲサレ、困難ナル事ヲ情モトシテ尤モ大本營ニ参列ヲ許サレ
ニハ必シモ現役ニテ要ス
- 一 平沼 少々モ豫後備ヲサレハカラス
- 一 鈴木 日清ノ時、伊藤首相ヲ入リ居リ、必シモ軍人ノ要ナシ
- 一 平沼 事實ニテ、話ナリナドモ豫後備ノ人ヲサレ、戦争ガ利ナドモ之ニテモ
戦ハヤ、後ク前提ナリ
- 一 岡田 今迄、御話ニ大體首相ノ性格ハ判リタリ
- 一 近衛 飽ク迄戦コヤ、後ノ軍人豫後備ニモ云フコトナシ
- 一 平沼 若槻氏、如何ニ、際不適任等ト云フコトハ云ハザル様ニ願度
- 一 若槻 事實ハ不適任ナリ、仕度ナシト云フコトナシ、恐ルナリ、勝ヲ後ク為メ、
人ナドモ、問題ニテラス、今平和ヲ裕議スルニ、條件降服(享命)行ハ
トハ明ナリ
- 一 平沼 統帥ト國務ノ關係ヨリ、陸海軍人タルコトヲ要ス、キモ必シモ現役
ニ限ラスト思フ

20/10

若槻大伴原則ハ判明シタルガ之ガ適用如何

平沼近衛公ハ御意見ハ如何

近衛今迄ハ行キカカリノオキ金口ロシカラハ

平沼之ハ世向国民が見テハ行キカカリノ無キ人信頼ノ置タル人
タル事ハ肝要ナリ

若槻此ノ前ハ陸軍中ヨリト言ヒ某氏ヲ述ベタルガ其レハ御珠
用ニナラナカク今日ハ陸海軍ノブニテモ良シ岡田サ
ハ御意見ハ如何

岡田自今モ眼界ハヤマイガ及ニマシ方面ノ方モ居ラルハ故
適任者ヲ出シ得ベシ

若槻内大臣ハ方針ニハ同意ナリヤ

木戸シカリ

若槻御意見ハ如何

木戸先づ各位ハ御意見ヲ

承ルガ今日ハ役目ナレハ隔
意無ク御発表願ヒ度シ於木戸ハ御意見如何

鈴木之迄ハ重臣ガ奮發サシテハ如何國家ニ殉スルノ覚

悟責任モアル御馬前ニテ討死ノ要ヲ悟ラ要ス首相

身体ヲ帶スル故一番若キ近衛公ニ願フ其後皆シ

ヤル四人ガ先づ御奮發ニナリテハ如何以前原議長モ

提案セラレタリト聞ク前議長農去一週日前親シク

ソ御話ヲ聴キ深ク感銘シタル事ヲ記憶ス是非ナラシ

テハ如何

近衛ソレハ先程ノ原則トハ違フ

平沼軍人デアル事近衛公ハ行懸リノ無キ人ト云ハレタウ之ヲ

誠ニ御方ナリ此ハ除国民信賴ヲナグ意味ニテ於木戸
ニ引込又願度希シスナリ

EX 1283

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Page 1.

Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary

August 9th, 1945.

..... At 1.30 p.m. Premier SUZUKI called at my office and reported that the Supreme War Guidance Council has decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the following conditions:
(1) Preservation of the Imperial Dynasty, (2) Independent evacuation of troops, (3) Handling in our own country of persons responsible for the war, and (4) No guarantee occupation.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex 1283
1.
Dec 1632 W (107)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
木月信館日記

昭和二十年八月九日分

八月九日 木 晴

午前九時大島豊氏齋藤貢氏來訪對ソ策等ニツキ話
ヲ聞ク

午前九時五十五分ヨリ十時迄御文庫ニテ拜謁ス
ソ聯ガ我國ニ對シ宣戰シ本日ヨリ交戰狀態ニ入レ
リ既テハ政局ノ收拾ニツキ急遽ニ研究決定ノ要ア
リト思フ故首相ト充分懇談スル様ニトノ仰アリ幸
ニ今朝首相ト面會ノ約アルヲ以テ直ニ謁談スベキ
旨奉答ス

十時十分過ぎ木首相來室依ツテ要旨ヲ傳ヘ此ノ際遠
ニボツダム宣言ヲ利用シテ戦争ヲ終結ニ導クノ必
要ヲ力説尙其ノ際事重大ナレバ重臣ノ意見ヲモ後
シタキ恩召アリ既テハ豫メ重臣ニ事態ヲ説明シ置
カル、様依頼ス首相ハ十時半ヨリ最高戦争會議ヲ
開催態度ヲ決定シタシトノコトニテ辞去セラル
十時五十五分ヨリ十一時四十五分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁

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2.

鈴木首相ト會見ノ頃末ヲ言上ス

十二時半岩波内駢頭來室追加豫算ノ説明ヲ聽ク

一時近衛公來室時局ニツキ懸談ス

一時半鈴木首相來室最高戦争指導會議ニ於テハ一、
皇室ノ承認二、自主的撤兵三、戦争責任者ノ自國
ニ於テノ處理四、保證占領セザルコトノ條件ヲ
以テボツダム宣言ヲ受諾スルコトニ決セリトノコ
トナリキ

二時武官長來室ソ捕國境戰ノ狀況等ヲ聽ク

二時四十五分高松宮殿下ヨリ御直ノ電話ニテ條件
附ニテハ聯合國ハ拒絕ト見ルノ虞レアリトノ御心
配ニテ右ノ善後策ニツキ御意見アリタリ

三時十分ヨリ三時二十五分廻御文庫ニテ拜讀右ノ
書念等ニツキ言上ス

季錫公先日ノ廣島爆撃ノ際戰死セラレタルヲ以テ
本日同邸ヲ弔問ス

四時重光氏來室四ノ條件ヲ出セハ決裂ハ必至ナリ
トノ論ニテ切ニ善處方ヲ希望セラル

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3.

四時三十五分ヨリ五時十分迄御文庫ニテ拜謁

六時半歸宅八時更ビ出仕

十時五十分ヨリ十時五十三分迄拜謁内閣ノ對策案

變更セラレタル件ニツキ言上ス

鈴木首相拜謁御前會議開催並ニ右會議ニ平沼權相

ト參列ヲ御許シ願フ

十一時二十五分ヨリ十一時三十七分迄拜謁

十一時五十分ヨリ翌二時二十分迄御文庫附屬室ニ

テ御前會議開催セラレ聖斷ニヨリ外務大臣衆タル

皇室天皇統治大權ノ確認ノミヲ條件トシボツダム

宣言受諾ノ旨決定ス